Author: Dominique-Dee Jones
Sub-editor: Grace Vanderkolk
Image credits: Karagiannis, Michalis. Golden Dawn members marching in Greece. c. 2020. Photograph. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/15/disgrace-high-ranking-golden-dawn-members-evade-justice.
The historical fascisms of Hungary and Greece and the contemporary reverberations of this experience in the development of far-right movements share important similarities that remain relatively unstudied. Despite the Hungarian Jobbik Party and Greece’s Golden Dawn (GD) being theorised as the most blatant reformulations of ‘a new fascism,’ their historiographies are not in conversation with each other. To begin, I outline the historical experience of fascism in Hungary and Greece as well as the development of the fascist-inspired far right. Following this I survey the general historiographical progression of understanding the relationship between fascism and the far-right after 1945. The rest of this essay deals with how Hungarian and Greek scholarship demonstrate contemporary far-right developments as historically grounded in national experiences of interwar fascism. Overall, both historiographies identify the historical connection between fascism and the far-right through the revival of fascist iconography and aesthetics and the continuation of post-war fascist networks. I contend that due to the limited scope and depth of Hungarian and Greek scholarship on fascism and the far-right future historiographical interventions need to further develop transnational methodologies. This will allow them to transcend chronological accounts of interwar fascism and the far-right and reimagine this relationship as a dynamic one wherein contemporary groups renegotiate the past.
Hungary’s historical experience of fascism can be first traced back to Gyula Gömbös’ leadership during the mid-1930s. A self-proclaimed ‘Hungarian National Socialist,’ Gömbös explicitly modelled himself upon Mussolini and pursued a German-Italian-Hungarian-Austrian alliance. During the Nazi occupation of Hungary (1944-1945), Hungarian fascism was cemented through the instalment of Ferenc Szálasi’s Arrow Cross Party (ACP) government. Initially, Szálasi directly imitated Hitler’s Programme. However his ambitions of reinstating a Greater Hungary, which involved reclaiming the territorial losses suffered as per the Treaty of Trianon, saw the development of ‘Hungarism’. Furthermore, as a Final Solution enthusiast, Szálasi’s government cooperated with Nazi Germany to deport approximately 400,000 Hungarian Jews. The increasing encroachment of Soviet forces saw Szálazi’s regime fall in 1945 bringing with it the establishment of the Second Republic of Hungary. Three years later the Hungarian People’s Republic was created, and state socialism was imposed. Throughout the next five decades, nationalist and far-right iconography, rhetoric and celebration were repressed.
With nationalism being ‘taboo’ during the People’s Republic, the fall of the Iron Curtain saw Hungary’s far-right community usher in a ‘renaissance’ of antisemitism and fascist-inspired activity. The 1993 Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) acted as a synthesis of the various far-right groups that festered underground in the post-war period. Later in 2005, MIÉP joined forces with Jobbik. 2010 saw the electoral success of far-right parties with Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán, forming government and Jobbik becoming the third-largest political party in Hungary. Whilst not as outwardly fascist-inspired as Jobbik, Fidesz shares similar far-right foundations. Upon their re-election, Fidesz reconfigured the Hungarian constitution to introduce a new favourable electoral system and launched a highly xenophobic anti-immigration campaign. Kondor and Paksa characterise contemporary Hungary as coming ‘dangerously close to a single-party state’ given Fidesz’s control over the media and education system.
Greece’s historical descent into fascism is credited to Ioannis Metaxas, the ‘Fascist Frankenstein,’ and his Fourth of August regime. Metaxas had bold aspirations of mirroring the success of National Socialism and sought to establish Greek parallels to the Nazi experience. With political exiles exiled, Metaxas focused his regime’s efforts on indoctrinating the Greek youth through the National Youth Organisation (EON). Operating as a Greek rendition of the Hitler Youth, participation was compulsory to ensure the development of young ‘conscientious’ Greeks. Metaxas’s admiration of the Axis powers ended abruptly when he rejected Mussolini’s desire to deploy Italian troops in Greece, leading the country into war. During the first phase of Axis occupation, the now Hellenic State was led by Georgios Tsolakoglou who continued to collaborate with Nazi Germany regarding the ’Jewish problem’. It is estimated that 85% of the Jewish Greek community perished during the puppet government’s term.
The reinvigoration of far-right Greek politics emerged in the late 1960s with the successful coup of the Regime of Colonels. Electoral practices had once again been abandoned and democratic freedoms squashed. Following the overthrow of the junta, far-right fascist-inspired groups remained on the fringes of Greek politics. It is upon the backdrop of this historical experience in which the contemporary GD party arose. Registered as a political party in 1993 by Nikolaos Michaloliakos, at the request of imprisoned junta leader George Papadopoulos, GD similarly achieved electoral success in the 2010s. Michaloliakos acted as the party’s ‘self-appointed führer’, overseeing the violent elimination of political opponents with an overt admiration for Nazism. In 2012, GD held 21 seats in the Greek Parliament wherein ministers denigrated immigrants as ‘subhuman,’ warranting their arrest following the election. In 2020, the leaders of GD, including Michaloliakos, were jailed for their involvement in the party which was classified as a criminal organisation.
General historiography on the relationship between historical fascism and far-right movements since 1945 has focused on the political chronology of these developments. An important flashpoint in the historiography of fascism is the 1960s when fascism was starting to be regarded as a separate phenomenon. It was no longer considered within the study of totalitarianism which lumped together fascism, Stalinism and Nazism. Once established historiographically as its own field, the post-war fascist legacy began to be considered among scholars. Contemporary historical consensus finds that interwar fascism morphed into neo-fascism in the post-war years due to the engagement between original fascists and emerging younger groups of right-wing activists. These interactions saw the transformation of fascist ideology to fit within the context of the late 20th century. With neo-fascism as the heir of historical fascism, the advent of globalisation in the 21st century saw a further permutation of fascism into populism.
Whilst representing and operating within various contexts, these renegotiations of historical fascism are connected by the ‘same transnational history of illiberal resistance to modern constitutional democracy’. However, Finchelstein also highlights how it is not just the chronology of fascism’s reformulation that should be attended to but how these categories exist within a spectrum. It is not the case that the development of the post-war far-right has occurred in a rigid linear matter as individuals and movements can move between populism and neo-fascism. Finchelstein contends that populism becomes neo-fascism once a certain criterion is met. This transition occurs when the ethnic homogenisation of the nation is bolstered by the articulation of an ‘enemy’ that is then met with ‘political violence’. When analysing contemporary far-right movements in Greece and Hungary, recent scholarship engages with Finchelstein’s spectrum model.
Contemporary research into far-right politics in Hungary and Greece consider the development of Fidesz, Jobbik and GD as neo-fascist. The fascist standard that is employed by recent scholars include the prevalence of racism, antisemitism, homophobia, violence and ultranationalism which is largely derived from the perspective of political science. Fidesz’s racially charged anti-EU posturing not only articulated immigrants as the common enemy of ethnic Hungarians but also resulted in the erection of a fence along the southern border. Similarly, GD’s ‘obsession’ with eugenic purity alongside its law and order strategy of violently supressing political opponents and immigrants fits within Finchelstein’s definitional parameters. Whilst not directly citing Finchelstein’s argument, the recent scholarship which denotes a neofascist label onto Fidesz and GD seems to mirror this distinction that attributes greater gravity to neo-fascism than populism. Discussion of how to define contemporary far-right developments in Hungary and Greece in scholarship is not so much about verifying the applicability of this label. Rather, it is more fruitful in its ability to establish the historical frame of fascism that is being used when endowing these labels. Thus whilst exhibiting clear differences in aims and methods, recent studies of the Hungarian and Greek far-right have begun to situate these developments in relation to their historical experiences of fascism.
Since both canons of scholarship view the developments in Hungary and Greece as neo-fascist, both share an academic interest in understanding how each reformulates historical fascism. As such, understanding of Hungarian and Greek far-right movements as neo-fascist overcome what Wiebke Keim identifies as a weakness of Finchelstein’s study of fascism and populism. Namely, the commitment to the neo-fascist label, especially in the Greek case, expands the scope of studying contemporary fascisms to include parties and movements which are not established regimes. General post-fascist historiography has established that far-right movements with fascist characteristics cannot be considered as direct reflections of fascism given current electoral constraints. That is to say, that present incarnations of far-right politics should not be interpreted as ‘re-enactment[s]’ of the past. Whilst core aspects have been maintained between today’s Hungarian and Greek far right and their historical fascisms, they have been unequivocally reappropriated to adhere to contemporary procedures. This reality is something understood in Hungarian and Greek historiographies of fascism and neofascism, however, important caveats are explored. It is in exploring the significance of such reformulations that the dynamic relationship between fascism and the post-war far-right can be established.
Scholars of Hungary and Greece’s far-right are similarly interested in how these groups renegotiate the central component of historical fascism of ousting democracy. However, they diverge in their explanation of how this obstruction is dealt with. In the Hungarian case, Kondor and Paska centre Fidesz’s reconfiguration of the national electorate as a method of fascist reformulation within electoral bounds. 2014 legislation granted citizenship rights to ethnic Hungarians abroad who live in surrounding countries like Romania. Such a rearrangement has seen Fidesz enjoy greater electoral representation as these newly considered voters comprise 10% of the base that supports Orbán’s policies. Moreover, Fidesz has almost decimated political opponents and strengthened their control through concerted propaganda campaigns. Therefore, despite operating within procedural constraints, Fidesz has been able to obscure Hungary’s democratic processes to assert its neo-fascist agenda. The context of Fidesz’s position in Hungarian politics makes this analysis more overt in comparison to GD who by existing as a former opposition party could not exercise such control over Greek politics.
Whilst Greek democratic procedures were not as malleable as in Hungary, Toloudis utilises an interdisciplinary approach to similarly highlight how GD formerly exercised neo-fascism within electoral parameters. Fusing historical considerations with political economy, Toloudis argues that GD recognised the historical implication of its incapacity to overcome democracy. As a result, GD utilised economic policy to assert its fascist-inspired agenda. GD’s anti-EU stance and focus on Greek agriculture and farming as the centre of economic production was, according to Toloudis, intrinsic to GD’s mobilisation of ethnic Greek purity. The destruction of immigrant-owned and operated businesses, the establishment of Greek-only food banks and pastoral care of Greek business-owners furthered this. This study is an important intervention that highlights how political economy can act as a sphere through which far-right movements can counteract their incapacity to replicate key aspects of fascism. Such a desire to counteract this incapacity is itself an indication of the process of reformulation that GD engaged in to remain situated within the fascist spectrum. These reformulations of their fascist predecessor and their historical legacy can also be seen in intergenerational cultural production.
Developing scholarship around the relationship between contemporary far-right movements and historical fascism in Hungary and Greece has taken place primarily through studying iconographic and aesthetic continuities. It is agreed that the interwar legacy of Hungarian National Socialism in terms of cultural production undergirds the contemporary far-right in Hungary. Specifically, Hungarian historiography has identified the revival of the Arpad Flag by the Hungarian Guard. The Hungarian Guard, which is a paramilitary arm connected to Jobbik, has reappropriated the Arpad Flag, signifying a direct aesthetic and ideological connection to the ACP. Furthermore, Kondor and Paksa, in their chronology of Hungary’s far-right, provide a cultural history of the skinhead neo-fascist groups that grew within the final years of the Hungarian People’s Republic. They analyse how the replication of fascist aesthetics through hypermasculine, militaristic clothing and behaviour marked the renewal of historical fascism during the end of the Cold War. In a similar vein, Greek scholarship, while less established, also identified the continuation of Nazi iconography by GD. GD interestingly however did not choose to replicate images used within the Metaxa era, instead opting to eerily replicate the swastika and perform Hitler salutes. Consequently, unlike the ACP, Metaxas’s fascism did not seem to occupy a significant space within GD’s political psyche.
When establishing a relationship between contemporary far-right movements and their national experiences of historical fascism through iconographic and aesthetic continuities, Hungarian and Greek scholarship could benefit from a more transnationally focused paradigm. Further analysis into how transnational connections can relegate national experiences of fascism with those of other countries is required to theorise GD’s choice to recall the German experience rather than the Greek experience. Moreover, these aesthetic revivals in both cases occur in a post-1968 context but pay little attention to the impact the political legacy of 1968 has in explaining these intensifications of neo-fascism. Pablo del Hierro in their survey of transnational neo-fascist networks in the 1970s argues that the radical leftism of 1968 saw the reinvigoration and innovation of neo-fascist ideology, tactics and activity. Considering how this directly applies to Hungarian and Greek neo-fascist groups during this time allows the necessary contextualisation of this phenomenon both temporally and spatially.
Additionally, Hungarian and Greek canons of scholarship have understood the relationship between fascism and the development of the current far-right through transnational post-war networks. Albeit a less developed field of study, recent scholars have begun to complexify chronologies of fascism in Hungary and Greece with micro-level analyses of exiled fascists. It is this fusion of political, cultural and transnational history that can move contemporary histographies away from focusing on short-term causes of far-rightism in post-fascist Europe. In the Hungarian case, Zoltán Kékesi follows two post-war fascists, Lajos Marschalkó and István Gyorkös, and their engagement in what Andrea Martini calls ‘ideological tourism’. Marschalkó wrote for Bridgehead, a leading publication for fascist exiles, which was published in London and disseminated throughout Western Europe, America and Australia. In tracking Marschalkó’s involvement in post-war fascist networks, especially through publications that strengthened transnational solidarity, we see clearer the endurance of fascist ideology and its current manifestations. Furthermore, ACP exile, Gyorkös’s, travel to Western Europe in the 1990s to organise neo-fascist cells within Austria, Germany and Hungary demonstrates the significance travel and international mobilisation have in the post-1989 fascist community.
This exercise is only replicated in recent Greek scholarship by Anna Zaptsi who follows the activity of GD during its establishment in the 1980s. Rather than focus on individuals like Kékesi, Zaptsi outlines how GD contacted other neo-Nazi groups such as the Spanish Circulo Español de Amigos de Europa and the French think-tank Groupement de recherche et d’études pour la civilisation européenne. However, Zapsti does not go further in examining how GD reformulated itself as a result of these engagements with like-minded groups. This aligns with the general trend among Greek scholarship of fascism and the far-right to exhibit an overly journalistic focus on understanding far-right groups. Regardless, these engagements between fascist exiles and the newly evolving generation of neo-fascists who now have direct links to the current far-right are integral to consolidating historical connections.
To conclude, it must be acknowledged that scholarship surrounding the most recent developments of the far-right in Hungary and Greece are naturally limited given the proximity of the electoral success of Fidesz, Jobbik and GD. However, important foundations have been laid in understanding these movements as historically grounded in the interwar period. Central to the future development of Hungarian and Greek scholarship on fascism and the post-war far-right is the focus on transnational networks and the reformulation of historical fascism. Considering these networks through micro-level contacts can also illuminate the degree to which these renegotiations of historical fascism in the post-war period can be understood as distinctly national. In the same way that Pelt questioned whether Metaxas’s fascist regime could be seen as a distinctly Greek phenomenon or as part of a global shift toward addressing the failures of liberalism—the rise of Fidesz, Jobbik and GD needs to be situated within the current climate of international populist politics.
Bibliography
Agostinone-Wilson, Faith. “Fascism and Right-Wing Populism: Similarities, Differences, and New Organizational Forms.” In Enough Already! A Socialist Feminist Response to the Re-emergence of Right Wing Populism and Fascism in Media, edited by Faith Agostinone-Wilson, 31-60. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020.
Albanese, Matteo. Neofascism in Europe (1945-1989): a long cultural journey. London; New York: Routledge, 2023.
Angouri, Jo, and Ruth Wodak. “’They became big in the shadow of the crisis’: The Greek success story and the rise of the far right.” Discourse & Society 25, no. 4 (July 2014): 540-565. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24441600.
del Hierro, Pablo. “’From Brest to Bucharest’: Neofascist transnational networks during the long 1970s.” European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire 29, no. 3 (2022): 520-547. doi: 10.1080/13507486.2021.1962253.
Dooley, Kevin L. “Political Trends in Central and East Europe: A Look at Hungary.” In Democracy in Crisis around the World, edited by Saliba Sarsar and Rekha Datta, 55-75. London: Lexington Books, 2020.
Europe New Journal. “Understanding the Rise of the Far Right: The Need for a Historical Approach.” Published November 2020.
Finchelstein, Federico. From fascism to populism in history. Oakland, California: University of California, 2019.
Greenberg, Udi. “Intellectual History and the Fascism Debate: On Analogies and Polemic.” Modern Intellectual History 20, (2023): 571-581. doi: 10.1017/S1479244322000129.
Keim, Wiebke. “Post-Fascists: Putting the So-Called “Populist Right” into Historical Perspective.” Journal of Historical Sociology 34, no. 4 (September 2021): 604-623. https://doi.org/10.1002/johs.12352.
Kékesi, Zoltán. Memory in Hungarian fascism: a cultural history. London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2023.
Kondor, Katherine, and Rudolf Paksa. “Hungary’s Goulash-Nationalism: The Reheated Stew of Hungary’s Far Right.” In The Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe, edited by Katherine Kondor and Mark Littler, 100-113. London: Routledge, 2023.
Laikos, Antonis, and Nicholas Doumanis. The Edinburgh history of the Greeks, 20th and early 21st centuries: global perspectives. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2023.
Martini, Andrea. “Travelling to See, Reading to Believe: Being Fascists after the End of the Second World War.” Contemporary European History (2023): 1-18. doi:10.1017/S0960777323000073.
Payne, Stanley G. “Review Article: Historical Fascism and the Radical Right.” Journal of Contemporary History 35, no. 1 Special Issue: Shell-Shock (January 2000): 109-118. https://www.jstor.org/stable/261185.
Pelt, Mogens. “The Establishment and Development of the Metaxas Regime in the Context of Nazi Fascism, 1936-41.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 2, no. 3 (2001): 143-172. doi: 10.1080/714005461
Petrakis, Marina. The Metaxas myth: dictatorship and propaganda in Greece. London; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006.
Prowe, Diethelm. “’Classic’ Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts.” Contemporary European History 2, no. 3 (Nov 1994): 289-313.https://www.jstor.org/stable/20081528.
Sotiris, Panagiotis. “The Dark Dawn of Greek Neo-Fascism: Golden Dawn and the Challenge for the Left.” Overland, no. 210 (2013): 32-37. https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/ielapa.201217806.
Toloudis, Nicholas. “The Political Economy of Fascism: Evidence from Greece.” Geopolitics 26, no. 5 (2021): 1464-1485. doi: 10.1080/14650045.2020.1726321.
Verousi, C., and C. Allen. “From Obscurity to National Limelight: The Dramatic Rise, Fall and Future Legacy of Golden Dawn.” Political Insight 12, no. 1 (2021): 22-25. https://doi.org/10.1177/20419058211000999.
Wilkin, Peter. “The Rise of ‘Illiberal’ Democracy: The Orbánization of Hungarian Political Culture.” Journal of World-Systems Research 21, no. 1 (2018): 5-42. doi: 10.5195/JWSR.2018.716.
Zaptsi, Anna. “The extreme far-right in Greece: the case of Golden Dawn.” In Más sobre Periodismo y Derechos Humanos Emergentes, edited by En J.M. Gómez y Méndez, M.C. Turón-Padial and M.J. Cartes-Barroso, 337-353. Seville: University of Seville, 2020.
Chariot Journal 